Protected targets / Live deploymentProofPatch Protected Target
Historical read-only
HISTORICAL FINALIZED EVIDENCE

Historical proof.

This superseded deployment is preserved as finalized historical evidence. Its proposal and lifecycle write controls are intentionally disabled.

UNAVAILABLEinstall state
Current version—read unavailable
Final invariants—read unavailable
Active proposal—read unavailable
NetworkBradburyGenLayer testnet · 4221
Historical deployment — read only

The canonical product is ProofPatch V3. This workspace remains available only to inspect the superseded finalized deployment; proposal creation, repair and lifecycle writes are not exposed here.

Open current V3
FINALITY PROOF

Consequence only after finality.

Complete
—
Finality chain unavailableAwaiting finalized reads
Unavailable—
EXACT BYTE IDENTITY

One hash. Three independent checks.

approved_candidate_sha256UNAVAILABLE
Governor current hash
Target installed hash
Local approved source hash
EVIDENCE BINDING

Trust is part of the policy.

Evidence set hash
—
Policy fingerprint
—
Final audit SHA-256
—
TARGET INVARIANTS

Upgrade did not rewrite identity.

Release
—
Owner
—
Governor
—
Protected value
—
TRANSACTION CENTER

No blind re-submission.

No tracked wallet transactions.

Once a transaction hash exists, ProofPatch stores it immediately and follows that exact transaction instead of blindly sending another one.

Persistent tracking ready
Publisher-bound evidence

Source, CI and independent audit authorities are policy-bound before a proposal can influence execution.

Immutable/versioned records

Candidate and evidence URLs must resolve through approved immutable repository prefixes.

Freshness + replay resistance

Evidence carries publication/expiry rules and scoped identifiers that cannot be reused for the same authority and target.

Repairable evidence failures

Correctable fetch, parse and hash failures move the proposal into a repair state instead of forcing an unsafe terminal path.

Exact consequential agreement

The candidate hash and authorization-driving semantic result are exact values, never fuzzy confidence thresholds.

Finality before consequence

The upgrade message is finality-bound; acceptance alone cannot replace the protected target code.